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COMMON MISTAKES IN APPELLATE PROCEDURE
A. J. STEVENSON*
An ancient statement, with which all law students are
familiar, is that, "A doctor buries his mistakes but a law-
yer's mistakes are written in the books."
Doubtless many of you are of the opinion that the
time of the Supreme and Appellate Courts of our state is
spent entirely in dealing with the mistakes of the trial
courts from which such appeals are taken. Such is not
wholly true.
In about 13 per cent of our cases motions are filed to
dismiss the appeal. These motions are usually predicated
upon failure of the attorneys for the appellant to recognize
and comply with the statutory requirements and rules of
the court governing appellate procedure.
During the calender year ending June 30, 1939, our
court passed upon 29 motions to dismiss appeals. During
the calendar year ending June 30, 1940, our court passed
upon 35 such motions. During the last year 8 appeals
were dismissed under Rule 16 for failure of the appellant
to file briefs within the time limit and 2 were transferred
to the Supreme Court because the appellant had mistaken
the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court in such matters.
In 1939 our court disposed of 186 cases. 31 cases, or
162/ per cent, of the number disposed of were not decided
upon the correctness of the judgment appealed from. In
1940, 172 cases were disposed of. Of this number, 17 per
cent were disposed of for reasons other than errors made
by the trial court. If you add to these percentages the
number of cases disposed of on motions to dismiss, it is
apparent that more than one-fourth of the time of the
court is occupied in dealing with mistakes made by law-
yers who represent their clients on appeal. It follows there-
fore that the business of the courts could be expedited if
many of the mistakes commonly made by the attorneys
on the appeal of cases could be eliminated.
I desire, therefore, to call your attention to a few of
An address delivered by Judge A. J. Stevenson at the Law Institute,
Fort Wayne, August 22, 1940.
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the mistakes which most frequently appear in the records
which come before us.
Rule 5 of the Revised Rules of the Supreme and Ap-
pellate Courts of Indiana, adopted June 21, 1937, and sub-
stantially embodied in Rule 2-6, 1940 Revision, provides
that, "The appellant shall attach to the front of the Tran-
script following the index a specific assignment of the errors
upon which he relies and he shall therein properly entitle
the cause." Now it seems that there should be no diffi-
culty in following this rule. Yet appeals come to our court
wherein the assignment of errors is found at the back of
the Transcript or in the center of the record. We .-nme-
times find the assignment of errors filed under a separate
cover and as a separate instrument, or even attached to the
front of the record and outside the covers.
However, Judge Tremain, in a recent decision of the
Supreme Court, in passing upon the question of compliance
with this rule said:
"Rule 5 of this court, adopted June 21, 1937, does require the
assignment of errors to be attached to the 'front of the transcript,
following the index.' This rule was made for the convenience of this
court, to facilitate the consideration of cases. The record in this ap-
peal is not voluminous, and we have not been seriously burdened by
this technical failure to comply with the rule. The appeal will not
be dismissed."'
It would seem, however, that even inexperienced law-
yers should find no difficulty in the proper preparation and
location in the record of the assignment of errors.
Another mistake commonly made has also to do with
the preparation of the assignment of errors. Rule 7 of the
Rules governing appeals provides that, "The assignment of
errors shall contain the full names of all parties to the
judgment, and process when necessary shall issue accord-
ingly."' 2 It seems that considerable difficulty is experienced
by attorneys in determining who shall be made parties on
appeal. It would seem an easy matter to name in the assign-
ment of errors all the parties to the judgment below. -The
question frequently arises, however, as to the necessity of
making parties those who were defaulted in the trial court.
1 Collins et al. v. Siegel et. al., 214 Ind. 206, 212, 14 N.E. (2d) 582, 584
(1938).
2Rule 2-8, Ind. Sup. & App. Cts, 1940 Rev.
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Our Supreme Court held in the case of the Second National
Bank, of Robinson, Ill. v. Scudder,3 that those defendants who
were personally served with process and made default are
not necessary parties on appeal. This statement is criticized
somewhat by the Supreme Court in a later decision in the
case of Johnson et al. v. Indianapolis Co.,4 wherein the court
stated that, "... it must be conceded that the expressions
in the opinions upon the question of whether or not de-
faulted defendants are necessary parties to an appeal, and
whether it is necessary to serve them with notice, are most
confusing." The rule is approved as announced in the Scud-
der case, however, on the basis that the Scudder case in-
volved a term time appeal. In the Johnson case the court
states that "notice to all co-parties of a vacation appeal is
a minimum requirement." The Supreme Court further de-
cided that parties before the court on constructive notice,
and defaulted, were necessary parties to an appeal.,
From an analysis of these cases it would seem proper
practice therefore to make all persons defaulted in the trial
court parties on appeal, save and except those term-time
appeals wherein the defaulted parties were personally served.
Some confusion has arisen as to the proper interpreta-
tion of the phrase "parties to the judgment." Our Supreme
Court recently held that "persons may be made parties to
an appeal when they were parties to the record and in-
terested in maintaining the judgment even though they were
not actually parties to the judgment." 6  In this case the
action was begun against the Chicago & E. I. R. R. Company
and afterwards one Thompson was appointed trustee for the
company and he was made an additional party defendant.
The trial court sustained a motion and entered an order
staying the proceedings permanently as against Thompson,
the trustee. Judgment was entered for the railroad company
on the trial of the case, and on appeal Thompson was made
a party. The Supreme Court held this proper even though
he was not a party to the judgment. The court said, "He
was still a party to the record when the judgment was entered
against the appellant. In maintaining this judgment the
3 212 Ind. 283, N.E. (2d) 955 (1937).
419 N.E. (2d) 940 (Ind. 1939).
GSecond National Bank v. Scudder, supra n. 3.
6 Bartley v. Chicago & E.I.R.A. Co., 24 N.E. (2d) 405 (Ind. 1939).
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trustee has such an interest as to justify making him a
party appellee to this appeal."' 7 In the light of this state-
ment, it is apparent that parties other than those named
in the judgment are in some instances proper parties on
appeal. A rule sufficiently broad to include all cases does
not seem to have been formulated.
Another mistake commonly made by attorneys has to
do with the preparation of the record for perfecting a term-
time appeal. The manner of perfecting a term-time appeal
is provided by statute and it has been many times held that
a failure to follow the steps as outlined operates to deprive
the court of jurisdiction of the appeal. Our statute pro-
vides that the court at the time of overruling the motion
for new trial shall fix the amount of the bond and the
time in which the same shall be filed and if that time is
beyond the term, shall designate and approve the surety on
such bond. Sec. 2-3204, Burns Ind. Statutes, 1933 Rev.
This is a matter that is vital in perfecting a term-time appeal
and so our court has held in the recent case of Reitzel v,.
Campbell," that failure to follow such procedure must result
in dismissal. In that case our court said:
"It is well settled that, in order for a party to perfect a term-
time appeal, it is essential that the bond be approved by the court
at the term at which the appeal is granted, or that the equivalent be
accomplished by the court fixing the amount of the bond and naming
and approving the sureties at such term, and by appellant filing the
same in accordance with such order, within the time granted by the
court and shown by the record."
Where the bond is not filed during the term, the pen-
alty of the bond and the time for filing it must be fixed
and the surety or sureties thereon must be approved by the
court during that term. It has accordingly been held that
where the bond is not filed in term-time, failure to fix the
amount and penalty of the bond deprives the court of jur-
isdiction in term-time appeals.9
Another common error which occurs time after time
in the records on appeal is embodied in the reasons given
in support of a motion for new trial. The statute defines
the causes for a new trial and the sixth statutory cause is
7Supra n. 6, at 407.
8 103 Ind. App. 650, 5 N.E. (2d) 148 (1936).
9 McClara v. Snow et al., 22 N.E. (2d) 900 (Ind. App. 1939).
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this: "That the verdict or decision is not sustained by suf-
ficient evidence or is contrary to law."10 It seems that this
is sufficiently plain and understandable, but many times
motions for new trial are filed which seek to embody causes
other than those designated by statute. Attorneys will as-
sign as causes for a new trial that the judgment of the court
is not sustained by sufficient evidence. And so it is necessary
for our court to say over and over again that "assigning
as causes for a new trial that the judgment is not sustained
by sufficient evidence or is contrary to law raises no ques-
tion."1
Similarly, assigning as reason for a new trial that the
judgment and decision of the court is not sustained by suf-
ficient evidence, that the judgment is against the weight of
the evidence, that the verdict of the jury is contrary to the
evidence, that the judgment or decision is clearly against
the weight of the evidence, and many others, have all been
held to be improper and insufficient to present any question.
While on the subject of new trials, let me say further
that in my opinion, generally speaking, motions for new
trial are entirely too long. They assign too many reasons.
I can hardly conceive of a case where it is necessary to
assign 100 reasons in support of a motion for new trial,
yet records come to us in which many more than that num-
ber are assigned in support of such motions.
In discussing Appellate practice, an article in the Indiana
Law Journal of March, 1932, contains this statement:
"There are but few substantial questions in any appeal. Some
attorneys, and this school is not a small one, believe in an om-nibus
attack, presenting everything trifling, or otherwise, in the hope as
Justice Holmes once said, that something would be made to stick.
Others concentrate on points which they can emphasize and, more-
over, do not smother up as a few grains of wheat in many bushels
of chaff. Moreover, arguments limited to 20 or 30 minutes on a
side would be excellent lessons in concentration. It is well-known
that the most efficient counsel appearing before the Supreme Court
of the United States are usually very brief. One famous member
of that court, a few years ago as a practitioner therein sucessfully
presented a very important case in a printed brief of 6 pages, citing
2 cases. Few cases will not lend themselves to a policy on the part
10 1933 Burns' Ind. Stat. §2-2401.
11 State ex rel. v. Boyd, 28 N.E. (2d) 256, 262 (Ind. 1940).
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of counsel of constantly narrowing the issue; as a case progresses
through the courts, they should gradually focus and not scatter"U
It would be a great time saver for both courts and
lawyers if only the propositions which constitute reversible
error were selected and discussed both in motions for new
trial and on appeal.
Another mistake commonly made by attorneys in the
appeal of cases involves the time for perfecting appeals.
The rules of practice and procedure now in force23 provide
that all appeals must be taken within 90 days from the
date of the judgment or the ruling on the motion for new
trial. Accordingly, our Supreme Court said, in the case of
Roebuck, et al. v. Essex,' 4 "The purpose of Rule 1 was to
reduce the maximum time for appeals. The rule must be
treated as controlling all appeals except those governed by
statute fixing a shorter time." It is apparent therefore,
that the statutory provisions which formerly controlled and
fixed the time for the perfecting of appeals no longer con-
trol. This is true in criminal cases where the statute pro-
vides that the transcript must be filed within 60 days after
service of notice of the appeal.15 So our Supreme Court
said in the case of Smith v. State:
"In this case the record shows that notice of the appeal was
acknowledged by the prosecuting attorney on December 3, 1937, and
the transcript was filed with the clerk of the Supreme Court on
February 26, 1938, 85 days after the service of notice. The 60-day
provision of the old statute does not now control. So long as a notice
has been given by the appellant and the transcript filed in the office
of the clerk within 90 days from the date of judgment or the ruling
on a motion for a new trial, it will be sufficient. The record in this
case discloses that the motion for a new trial was overruled Dec.
1, 1937, 87 days before the record was filed in this court. This was
sufficient. The motion to dismiss the appeal was heretofore properly
denied."' 6
It is apparent from the cases above cited that the 90-day
rule now governs all appeals and yet quite frequently at-
torneys fail to file their record within this allotted time.
12Bomberger, Unnecessary Delays in Appellate Procedure, 7 Ind.-L.J.
348 (1932).
13 Rule 1, Ind. Sup. & App. Cts, 1937; Rule 2-2, Ind. Sup. & App. Ct,
(1940 Rev.)
14214 Ind. 637, 17 N.E.(2d) 460 (1938).
15 1933 Burns' Ind. Stat., §9-2308.
1619 N.E.(2d) 549 (Ind. 1939).
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Approximately one-fourth of the cases dismissed by
our court are dismissed because of failure to file the tran-
script as directed in the Clerk's office within 90 days after
the date of the judgment or the overruling of the motion
for new trial.
Considerable difficulty is also experienced in the manner
of the giving of notices required in vacation appeals. Our
statute provides that after the close of the term at which
the judgment is rendered an appeal may be taken by the
service of a notice in writing on the adverse party or his
attorney and also on the Clerk of the court in which the
proceedings were had. When this is done the party may
perfect his appeal by filing his transcript in the Clerk's
office within the allotted time. This is commonly described
as the unofficial notice. The statute further provides that
if the unofficial notice is not given, such an appeal may be
taken by filing the transcript in the office of the Clerk of
the Supreme Court and upon such filing the Clerk of the
Supreme Court shall issue notice of the appeal to the appellee.
Sec. 2-3206, Burns Ind. Statutes, 1933 Rev. This is common-
ly known as the official notice. Lawyers sometimes ap-
parently confuse this procedue and attempt to file their
transcript in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court
and then serve the adverse parties with notice of such appeal.
This they cannot do. After the transcript is filed with the
Clerk, only the Clerk may issue the notice. So in the case
of Gainey et al. v. Hasler, 95 Ind. App. 209, in discussing
such procedure, our court said, "Under our Appellate pro-
cedure appellant could not give an unofficial notice of an
appeal to this court after he had filed the transcript with
the clerk." Under the new rules effective September 1,
1940, proof of the giving of such unofficial notices must
be filed in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court at
the time the transcript of the record is filed.17 This new rule
will doubtless obviate some of the mistakes which have arisen
with regard to the proper notices required in vacation appeals.
Further difficulty has been experienced by many at-
torneys in the preparation of the record dealing with the
bill of exceptions. Bills of exceptions may be filed during
term-time without an order of the court. However, when
17 Rule 2-4, Ind. Sup. & App. Cts. (1940 Rev.)
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a bill of exceptions is to be filed after term, leave therefore
must be given by the court at the time of the ruling on the
motion for new trial.18 It frequently happens, however, that
attorneys for some reason are unable to have the record so
prepared. In a recent case the court overruled a motion for
new trial near the last day of the term. No time was given
by the court in which to file a bill of exceptions. This
ruling was made on the 31st day of July, 1937. The at-
torney for the appellant was not present at the time this
ruling was made and had no knowledge thereof. The term
of court ended August 4. He accordingly, on the first day
of the succeeding term, which was October 4th, asked and
obtained time in which to file his bill of exceptions. This
was accordingly done and an attempt to perfect an appeal
was made. Our court was compelled to hold that the bill
of exceptions was not properly within the record. Crouse v.
Crouse, 106 Ind. App. 565.
From these experiences as above detailed, I have come
to the conclusion that the common mistakes in Appellate
procedure are occasioned because of the following condi-
tions:
(1). The lawyers do not take the time to re-read and
have fresh in their minds the rules of the court when pre-
paring their case for appeal.
(2). Insufficient time and study is given to the prepar-
ation of the record for appeal after the date of the verdict
or decision.
I also believe that fewer mistakes would be made if
the attorneys were able and willing to select and present
only such errors as are vital to the decision of the case on
appeal.
If these conditions could be corrected the work of both
the courts and the lawyers would be materially lessened.
18 Harker v. Eisenhut, 212 Ind. 67, N.E. (2d) 936 (1937).
